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Abstract: This paper analyzes the problem of international environmental cooperation as a coalition
formation game. For this purpose, we develop a simple model with three countries of unequal size. Strate-
gic interactions between those countries come from the imperfect competition among producers in global
markets and from the transboundary pollution generated by the rms. To capture e¢ ciency gains from
coordinating policies, countries can join a coalition and sign an international environmental agreement.
The equilibrium coalition structure then depends on the country-size asymmetry and on the marginal
environmental damage. Interestingly, we show that the grand coalition is less likely to emerge as an equi-
librium outcome once two countries form a subcoalition. Furthermore, the further enlargement of the
initial subcoalition can be blocked either by the outsider or by the insiders.
Keywords: Tax coordination, Transboundary Pollution, International Trade, Oligopoly, Coalition Forma-
tion
JEL Classication: F55, H23, Q56
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1 Introduction
Some of the most serious environmental problems that urgently call for solutions are those related to trans-
boundary pollution, greenhouse gas emissions and climate change. The Kyoto Protocol was symbolically
an important step, but it failed to deliver a global e¤ort toward greenhouse gas reductions. More recently,
the Copenhagen summit on climate change in December 2009 involved representatives of 193 countries
with the aim to obtain a general agreement on how to cut global emission of greenhouse gases. Unfortu-
nately, Copenhagen summit ended in a failure. The so-called Copenhagen accord recognizes the scientic
case for keeping temperature rises to no more than 2 Celsius, but does not contain any commitments to
emissions reductions to achieve that goal. The Swedish EUs presidency then termed the general outcome
of that summit as a disasterand declared both China and the United States, the worlds number one and
two polluters, responsible for the result. Even at the European level, obtaining a general environmental
agreement is quite di¢ cult. Indeed, since the early 1990s, there have been several attempts to introduce
a unitary carbon tax across all EU member states.1 But it has never materialized, as countries like the
UK were unwilling to render national competencies on taxation to Brussels. Another example is given
by France in autumn 2009 which outlined a plan to set up a national carbon tax, following the example
of Scandinavian countries which introduced such a tax on fuels back in early 1990s. But, the bill was
rejected by the countrys highest court on the grounds that the bill contained (too many) unconstitutional
exceptions. Finally, French president did not support the bill, saying that France needed support from the
rest of the European Union before it would proceed with a carbon tax.
The di¢ culty of coordinating environmental policies among sovereign countries is inherent to the global
trend of trade liberalization. Indeed, in the context of free-trade, governments are reluctant to abandon
sovereignty on environmental policies because they can use these policies for trade related goals. For
example, it is often argued that governments may relax their environmental standards in order to gain
a competitive advantage over their trading partners. Conrad (1993) and Barrett (1994a) indeed show
that under imperfect competition, governments have an incentive to use environmental policies in order
to implicitly subsidize their exports. This lead to standards or pollution taxes below the Pigouvian
level, and to what has become called as the environmental dumping e¤ect. However as emphasized
by Kennedy (1994), strategic distortions may also play in opposite direction. Government may indeed
raise environmental standards in order to export polluting production since goods can be imported. A
critical factor to determine which strategic distortion is likely to dominate the other is then the degree to
1Note though that in conjunction with the Kyoto protocol, the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (or EU ETS),
which is the largest multi-national greenhouse gas emissions system, was launched in January 2005. Nevertheless, this system
covers only half of the European CO2 emissions.
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which pollution is transboundary. When pollution is perfectly transboundary, as in the case of greenhouse
gas emission, the pollution-shifting e¤ect vanishes because foreign pollution causes as much damage to
the domestic environment as does domestic pollution. In this case, trade liberalization therefore leads to
environmental dumping.2
This paper examines the problem of coordination of environmental tax policies between several het-
erogenous countries in the context of free trade, and extends the standard analysis of strategic environ-
mental policies into several complementary directions. First, unlike most analysis of environmental policies
under imperfect competition, we introduce domestic consumption within each production region. Second,
we assume that countries are of unequal size. This, we believe, better represent real-world situations since
most international agreements involve a small country (or a few small countries) and a large partner as
the US or the EU. Last but not least, we model the emergence of a stable international environmental
agreement as a coalition formation game.
More specically, the model employed in this paper is the following. There are three countries of
unequal population size and in each one of them, there is a single rm producing a homogeneous good
X. Production of X generates pollution emissions that spread perfectly across the national borders. We
also assume that governments cannot use import tari¤ or export subsidies and that there is no shipping
costs. In a word, free-trade prevails and the three monopolists compete à la Cournot in all three countries.
Finally, a production or emission tax is the sole policy instrument at governmentsdisposal to deal
with the market failure of imperfect competition (on domestic and international markets) and that due to
polluting production. In this setting, there are thus gains to coordinating tax policies and our objective is
to determine whether a stable cooperative arrangement can be reached to exploit these gains.
Our analysis of such arrangements is framed by a three stage game. In the rst stage, countries choose
their coalition partners. A coalition forms if there is unanimity with respect to a partnership plan, that
is each country would like to join precisely the other(s) in a coalition. In the second stage, each coalition
commit to tax polluting production at a rate that maximizes the coalitions aggregate welfare. Finally, in
the third stage, rms decide (non-cooperatively) on quantities, taxes are levied, international trade occurs
and consumption takes place. We also assume that the cooperative arrangement (if any) prescribes that the
scal revenues raised remain in the country of origin. In other words, there is no transfer payments between
countries, which seems reasonable to assume as (very) few environmental agreements have provisions for
transfers. In this set-up, we then dene a stable cooperative arrangement as an equilibrium coalition
structure which is immune to any unilateral or multilateral deviations.
2As shown by Barrett (1994a), this conclusion holds provided competition in international markets is Cournot. Otherwise,
if competition is Bertrand, then governments will impose strong environmental standards.
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The main result is that if two countries can benet from being part of a subcoalition, then the grand
coalition is less likely to emerge as an equilibrium coalition structure, whilst the three countries would
have agreed to join the grand coalition if the sole alternative was the singleton coalition. Furthermore, the
grand coalition can be blocked not only by one country called the outsider but also by a subcoalition
of two countries.
Intuitively, when a subcoalition of two countries is formed, it gives rise to a strategic advantage for
the outsider. Indeed, this last can take advantage of the internalization of the pollution externality by the
coalition resulting in higher taxes and then in increased production costs for the rms of the coalition 
to make its own rm more competitive on international markets. In turn, this makes the grand coalition
less likely to emerge because the outsider is now more demanding to give up its competitive advantage
created by the formation of the subcoalition. In other words, the pollution externality and the benets of
internalizing this externality must be higher than when the only alternative to the singleton coalition is
the grand coalition. However, when both the spillover parameter and the population size of the outsider
become very large, the two countries of the subcoalition prefer the largest country to stay outside the
coalition and free-ride on them. This is because, in this case, the formation of the grand coalition would
lead to a signicant decrease in produced and consumed quantities  due to the internalization of the
pollution externality over all three countries which in turn would lead to a strong decrease in export
revenues for the two (small) countries of the coalition. Certainly, with a two-coalition structure, the two
members of the coalition loose markets shares to the benet of the outsider, but the market size is also
much larger than under the grand coalition and a large market size mostly benet to small countries.
This paper contributes to and connects two di¤erent strands of the literature: the one on the use of
the relationship between international trade and environmental policies and the other on international
environmental agreements (IEAs). In general, since Barrett (1994b), the rst strand of literature considers
that countries compete on a third market. This greatly simplies the analysis because, in this case, there
is no consumer surplus in domestic welfare. It follows that environmental policy of each country only takes
into account environmental damage and the competitiveness in terms of production costs of the domestic
rms. When rms compete in domestic markets, as here, governments have an incentive to deal with the
imperfect competition e¤ect because it harms consumer surplus. Kennedy (1994) or Tanguay (2001) also
consider imperfect competition and that trade occurs between countries and not in a third market. But
in their analysis, and in contrast to the present one, there is no heterogeneity across countries. There
is however a paper by Duval and Hamilton (2002) who analyze strategic environmental policy in a two-
country model with asymmetric number of rms and asymmetric pollution di¤usion across countries, but
they do not investigate the issue of environmental policy coordination. We investigate another source of
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heterogeneity across countries  in terms of population and market sizes and principally focus on the
stability of international environmental agreements in a coalition formation game.3
The earliest works (Hoel, 1992; Carraro and Siniscalco, 1993; Barrett, 1994b) analyze a global emission-
abatement game and characterize equilibrium IEAs by applying the internal-external stability concept
developed for cartel theory (dAspremont et al., 1983). These works have been extended in many directions
including that of heterogeneous countries participating in an IEA (e.g. Finus and Rundshagen, 1998;
Barrett, 2001). In this paper, we also investigate the stability of IEAs but in a context of imperfect
competition in global markets. In addition, drawing on the recent literature on endogenous coalition
formation (see, Bloch, 1996; Yi, 1996; Ray and Vohra, 1999), we consider deviations not only by single
countries but also by subgroup of countries to determine which IEA emerges as an equilibrium coalition
structure.4
It is worth pointing out that these extensions were made possible by assuming that the world is
composed of only three countries, thereby substantially limiting the number of possible coalition structures.
In addition, we will assume at some point that two of the three countries are of equal size which further
restrains the number of coalition structures to be analyzed. Yet, the model used in this paper is rich
(and complex) enough to put forward the idea  in a single and coherent analytical framework  that
when a subset of countries sign an IEA, then a further extension of the coalition may be blocked either
by the outsider or by the insiders. In fact, the result that the outsider may refuse to join the (grand)
coalition may seem expected (and quite intuitive) because sub-global agreements, in general, give rise
to a strategic advantage to the outsider(s). An IEA corresponds in many aspects to the provision of a
public good generating positive externalities for the outsider so that this last is better o¤ free-riding on
the coalition. But, in our analysis, the members of a subcoalition may also refuse the entry of the outsider
in the (grand) coalition. That result is rather unexpected and much less intuitive. In a word, when the
pollution externality and the country-size asymmetry (between insiders and the outsider) are relatively
strong, then the benets of the new entry (for the two countries of the initial coalition) may be too low to
compensate the loss in term of export revenues due to the drastic change in the environmental policy
of the grand coalition.5
3 In a recent paper (Cheikbossian, 2010), we analyzed the problem of coordinating environmental policies among two
asymmetric countries. But, in a two-country model, we cannot investigate the formation and the stability of global and
sub-global agreements.
4Recently, some authors have applied approach of coalition formation to the analysis of IEAs (see, e.g., Carraro and
Marchiori, 2003, or Finus and Rundshagen, 2009). But, again, most authors use a global emission-abatement game which
often needs to be solved numerically.
5 In the same spirit, Alesina and Grilli (1993) show that the twelve potential members (in 1993) of the European monetary
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In Section 2, we present the general framework. Section 3, 4 and 5 derive the outcome of the in-
ternational policy game under respectively the singleton coalition, the grand coalition and the coalition
structure with only two countries forming a coalition. In Section 6, we give a precise denition of an
equilibrium coalition structure and then derive the outcome of the coalition formation game, depending on
the parameter reecting the pollution externality and that reecting the asymmetry in population sizes.
2 The Model
2.1 The Households
We consider a world composed of three countries, N = fA;B;Cg. There are ni consumers in country i
and we normalize total population to 1, i.e. nA +nB +nC = 1. Two goods are consumed in each country.
The numeraire good Y is produced by competitive rms, while good X is produced under conditions of
imperfect competition. Pollution is generated as a by-product of the production of X and this pollution
cross borders. The Y industry does not pollute. An individual consumer in country i has the quadratic
utility function:
ui = xi   (1=2)x2i + yi  D (X) ; i = A;B;C; (1)
where x and y are per capita consumption levels of X and Y respectively, and where D (X) is the envi-
ronmental damage incurred by the consumer. This damage is a function of world production of X (which
is identically denoted as X). Finally,  corresponds to the maximal marginal utility of X.
An individual is assumed to own L units of labor, and the production function for Y is simply Y = Ly,
where Ly is the labor allocated to the production of Y . Again, Y (or L) is the numeraire and pi is the
consumer price of good X in country i in terms of Y (or L). The production of good X under conditions
of imperfect competition will be more precise in the next sub-section.
In addition, in each country, all revenues that the government obtains from taxation are distributed
equally and in a lump-sum fashion across the population. (If these revenues are negative, this implies that
each government can impose lump-sum taxes on its population). Denoting the per capita tax revenues by
Ti, the budget constraint facing a representative household in each country is:
L+ Ti = yi + pixi; i = A;B;C: (2)
Maximization of (1) subject to the budget constraint (2) yields the representative households inverse
demand of good X:
union (EMU) may not agree to enlarge it once it is formed, due to the heterogeneity in preferences (and in economic
conditions) of the potential new entrants. It has to be said that it was not the case.
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  xi = pi; i = A;B;C: (3)
A convenient feature of the quadratic utility function (1) is that the individuals tax return do not enter
the demand for good X since at the margin, income changes a¤ect only the demand for the numeraire
good Y . Aggregating over households in each country yields the following market demand curves for each
of the three countries:
Xi = nixi = ni (  pi) ; i = A;B;C; (4)
where Xi represents aggregate consumption of good X in country i.
2.2 The Firms and the Environmental Damage
There is in each country a monopolist that produces good X.6 More specically, the X rm produces with
a constant marginal cost m and with xed costs F (all in terms of units of labor).
For all rms, production leads to the emission of the same pollutant which is transboundary. We assume
that one unit of pollution is produced by one unit of X whether production takes place in the home country
or in the foreign countries. We also assume that pollution is a pure public bad so that consumers in all
countries are equally harmed by the pollution released from any country. More specically, pollution
generates environmental damage in country i (for i = A;B;C) according to the following form
D (X) =  XA +XB +XC ; (5)
where Xi (for i = A;B;C) represents the production of the rm located in country i and where  2 (0; )
is a parameter that captures the marginal environmental damage caused by the production of X. We
suppose that this marginal environmental damage cannot be higher than the maximal marginal utility of
X given by , otherwise production of X would not be socially benecial.
The three countries constitute a common market. Each monopolist can export in the two other markets
at no shipping costs. Xi being the demand for good X in country i (for i = A;B;C), the aggregate demand
in the integrated economy is
XA +XB +XC =   p: (6)
In equilibrium, aggregate demand equals aggregate supply, i.e. XA +XB +XC .
6Monopoly can emerge as an equilibrium market structure if rm-specic xed costs are su¢ ciently high to make entry
for a second rm unprotable in each market (see, Horstman and Markunsen 1992).
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In order to reduce emissions, each government can charge a tax on the production of X that is produced
by the domestic rm. Let ti be the per-unit production tax set by the government of country i. Prots
for the rm located in country i are
i =

   Xi +Xj +XkXi  mXi   tiXi   F; i = A;B;C; i 6= j 6= k: (7)
Since an increase in the marginal cost m is equivalent to a decrease in , we set m = 0 for sake of
simplicity.7
Di¤erentiating this prot expression with respect to Xi, and setting the derivative equal to zero yields
the following best response functions of the rms,
Xi =
 ti (Xj+Xk)
2 ; i = A;B;C; i 6= j 6= k: (8)
The Nash equilibrium in quantities is then given by
Xi =
 3ti+tj+tk
4 ; i = A;B;C; i 6= j 6= k: (9)
Firms is production is decreasing in the domestic pollution tax rate and increasing in the pollution tax
rate faced by its competitors. In equilibrium, aggregate supply, i.e. XA + XB + XC , equals aggregate
demand, i.e. XA + XB + XC .8 Since total population is normalized to 1, aggregate supply or aggregate
demand also corresponds to individual consumption of good X in the three countries, that is
xA = xB = xC = x = [3  (tA + tB + tC)] =4: (10)
Expressions (6), (9) and (10) complete the output stage of the model.
We can now express the domestic welfare of each country as the sum of net consumer surplus which
includes the environmental damage, plus prots, plus tax revenues, that is
Wi = ni

1
2x
2
i + L  
 
XA +XB +XC

+ i + tiX
i; i = A;B;C: (11)
To simplify the interpretation of the results, we shall use another expression of the domestic welfare of
each country. First, recall that aggregate production equals aggregate and individual consumption, and
so we denote by p (x) =   x, the market price. Now, adding and subtracting the term nip(x)x - i.e. the
value of domestic consumption in country i - into (11), we can express the welfare level of country i as
follows
7We also assume, throughout the analysis, that prots are always strictly positive in all three countries, i.e.prot margin
implied by the choice of the (exogenous) parameters  and  is su¢ ciently large to cover the xed costs F .
8We assume throughout that L is su¢ ciently large such that the consumers are able to pay for the X produced.
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Wi = ni

1
2x
2 + (p (x)  )x+ L+ p(x)(Xi   nix)  F; i = A;B;C; (12)
The rst term corresponds to the gross consumer surplus denoted by CSi = ni

1
2x
2 + (p (x)  )x+ L,
and the second term corresponds to the value of external trade denoted by EXi = p(x)(Xi   nix), which
can be positive (negative) if country i is a net exporter (importer).9
The objective in this paper is to determine whether there exists stable cooperative arrangements among
the three countries to deal with the two market failures: the pollution externality and the imperfect
competition in global markets. To this end, we consider the following three-stage game. In the rst stage,
countries decide on their membership in a coalition. In the second stage, each coalition sets a tax rate on
polluting production. Finally, in the third stage, rms play the Cournot-Nash game described just above,
international trade occurs and consumption takes place.
We now turn to the second stage at which countries are already aligned into coalition structures. A
coalition structure is a partition of the set of countries and there are three types of possible coalition
structures: the singleton coalition denoted BS , the grand coalition denoted BG and the structure which
involves a coalition between only two countries i and j, while country k remains a singleton. This coalition
structure will be denoted B(i;j)  ffi; jg ; fkgg. We rst analyze the case where no arrangement has been
agreed in the rst stage of the game, what corresponds to the singleton coalition BS .
3 The Singleton Coalition Structure BS
The singleton coalition structure corresponds to the situation where the three countries play a Nash game
in tax rates. In other words, each country chooses its tax rate on production so as to maximize domestic
welfare, taking as given the other countriestax rates and anticipating the behavior of both the rms and
the consumers.
Substituting (7), (9) and (10) into (11), di¤erentiating this expression with respect to ti, and setting
the derivative equal to zero yields the following countriesbest response functions in tax rates,
ti (tj ; tk) =
4ni (2+3ni) (2 ni)(tj+tk)
6 ni ; i = A;B;C i 6= j 6= k: (13)
Best response functions are downward sloping. Indeed, as it is typically the case in a Cournot oligopoly
model of international trade à la Brander and Spencer (1985), when one country increases its tax rate,
the other countries have an incentive to lower their tax rates which enables the domestic rms to further
increase their shares of international markets.
9Equivalently, each countrys welfare can be written as the di¤erence between gross surplus CSi and total costs denoted
TCi, i.e. Wi = CSi   TCi. These costs are the sum of production costs, i.e. mXi + F = F since m = 0, plus the costs of
imports, i.e. p(x)(nix Xi).
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Solving this system of best response functions, we obtain the following equilibrium tax rates under the
singleton coalition BS ,
ti (BS) = (10 9)ni 29 i = A;B;C: (14)
Using (10) and (14), the per capita consumption level of X in each country is x (BS) =    =9 and the
equilibrium price is p (BS) = =9. In equilibrium, aggregate demand (i.e. x (BS)) is equal to aggregate
production, and substituting (14) into (9), we obtain the production of the rm located in country i
(for i = A;B;C), i.e. Xi (BS) = [(9  10)ni + 3] =9. The gross surplus for country i is CSi (BS) =
[(1=162) (9  17) (9  ) + L]ni, and the value of its external trade is EXi (BS) = p (BS) (Xi (BS)  
nix (BS)) or EXi (BS) =
 
2=27

(1  3ni). Substituting these expressions into the welfare function given
by (12), we obtain the welfare of each country when the singleton coalition structure prevails, that is
Wi (BS) = 1162

(6  ni)2 + 81ni(  2)

+ niL  F: (15)
To conclude this section, we consider the di¤erence in tax rates between countries at the Nash equilibrium.
Suppose rst that the marginal cost of environmental damage is not too high, i.e.  < (9=10), and
that, for example, nA > nB > nC . This implies from (14) that tA (BS) < tB (BS) < tC (BS). The factor
explaining why, when  < (9=10), a small country has an incentive to set a higher tax rate than the
other(s) is related to the openness of the economies. Indeed, the national monopolists compete against
each other in a common market and without governmental regulation, each would get an equal share of
the market, and so a relatively small country would be a net exporter. A small country is thus at some
intrinsic advantage to capture oligopoly rents from foreign consumers and, consequently, has less need to
reduce its tax rate in order to gain a competitive advantage over its trading partner.10 Put it di¤erently,
an exporting country has an incentive to set a higher tax rate because a portion of the tax is shifted
into world prices, which disproportionately a¤ects consumers of the importing country. Inversely, a large
country has an incentive to reduce its imports and hence to set a lower tax rate than smaller countries so
as to increase domestic production.
However, increasing production also reduces the gross consumer surplus to the extent of both the
marginal cost of pollution  and the size of the population. Indeed, the marginal gross consumer surplus
in country i is negative, that is CSmi = ni [p (BS)  ] =  ni (8=9) since p (BS) = =9. Therefore, when
the marginal cost of environmental damage is relatively high, i.e.   (9=10), a large country has no
longer incentives to undercut its competitor(s) and hence it sets a higher tax rate at the Nash equilibrium
(see (14)).
10This e¤ect is similar to the terms-of-trade e¤ect identied by (among others) Krutilla (1991).
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4 The Grand Coalition BG
Suppose now that the three countries are willing to form the grand coalition which means that they jointly
decide to tax polluting production in all three countries at rates that maximizes the sum of the welfare
functions given by (11). Note however that coalition members retain the responsibility to levy taxes and
that all revenues raised remain in the country of origin.
Since the countries form a common market and since environmental damage is linear in pollution, there
is a unique (linear) tax rate that maximizes the (grand) coalitions aggregate welfare. Actually, uniform
(tax) solutions are frequently viewed as e¢ cient means to tackle a (pure) global environmental problem
and furthermore often constitutes a typical feature of many IEAs to reduce the emission of pollutants (see,
e.g., Hoel 1992; Finus and Rundshagen, 1998).
Therefore, we can set tA = tB = tC = t which implies that XA = XB = XC and A = B = C = .
Then, the aggregate welfare of the grand coalition is given by
W =

1
2x
2 + L  x+ 3 + tx; (16)
since XA + XB + XC = x. Using (10), we have x = 34 (  t) and the prot of each rm is then
 = (  t)2 =16  F . Di¤erentiating W with respect to t and setting the derivative equal to 0, we obtain
the following pollution tax rate under the grand coalition BG,
t (BG) = 4 3 : (17)
This common pollution tax rate is set to correct for two distortions as the market is characterized by both
over-production due to the negative externality and under-production due to oligopoly pricing. Then, the
policy of the grand coalition levies a second-best tax below the marginal cost of pollution (equal to )
which can be, in principle, either positive or negative.11
From (10), individual consumption of good X in each country is x (BG) =     and the equilibrium
price is p (BG) = . In equilibrium, aggregate demand is equal to aggregate supply and the three rms have
an equal market share of the integrated economy (i.e. 1=3), and then each produces Xi (BG) = (  ) =3
(for i = A;B;C). The gross surplus for country i is CSi (BG) =
h
(1=2) (  )2 + L
i
ni, and the value of
its external trade is EXi (BG) = p (BG) (Xi (BG)  nix (BG)) or EXi (BG) = [ (  ) =3] (1  3ni).
Substituting the above expressions into (12), we obtain the aggregate welfare of country i in the grand
coalition, i.e.
11The marginal variation of the gross consumer surplus is  x  and is positive as long x <  . Without environmental
regulation, the aggregate supply - which equals x - is 3=4 (see (10)). Hence, the common tax rate is negative as long
3=4 <    i.e. 4    < 0.
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Wi (BG) = 16 (  ) [2 + 3ni (  3)] + niL  F; i = A;B;C: (18)
5 The Coalition Structure B(i;j)
Suppose now that two countries say countries i and j form a coalition and choose a common tax rate,
denoted tij , so as to maximize their joint-welfare Wi + Wj , where Wi and Wj are given by (11). As for
the grand coalition, each coalition partner still has the responsibility to levy and collect taxes on its own
territory and there is a unique tax rate maximizing the subcoalitions aggregate welfare.
The third country i.e. country k remains a singleton. In the last stage of the game, each rm still
maximizes its prots independently of the other rms, given tij and tk. From (9) with ti = tj = tij , we
have the following equilibrium quantities
Xi = Xj =
 2tij+tk
4 ; X
k =
 3tk+2tij
4 : (19)
Again, since the market is common, there is only one price p and therefore individual consumption of good
X is identical in the three countries and is given (using (10)) by
x = [3  (2tij + tk)] =4: (20)
It follows that the equilibrium market price is p = (+ 2tij + tk) =4. The prot of each rm of the
coalition is i = j = (  2tij + tk)2 =16   F , while the prot of the rm located in country k is
k = (  3tk + 2tij)2 =16  F .
In the second stage of the game, the coalition and country k choose their pollution tax rates indepen-
dently of each other so as to maximize their respective welfare. Substituting (19), (20) and prots into
(11), and maximizing Wi +Wj with respect to tij yields
tij(tk) =
(ni+nj)(4 3+tk)
2[4 (ni+nj)] : (21)
Observe that the best response function of the coalition is upward sloping. The explanation is the following.
Suppose that country k increases its tax rate by dtk. Then, the monopolist located in country k reduces
its production level while each monopolist of the coalition increases its production (see eq. (19)). The key
point is that the two monopolists of the coalition act independently of each other in the oligopoly game.
In order to internalize the increased competition between the two monopolists, the coalition best reacts to
an increase in tax rate in the third country by increasing its own tax rate so as to internalize the market
externality between the two monopolists located on its territory. In turn, it makes the two rms of the
coalition act as if they were a single rm.
Similarly, substituting (19), (20) and prots into (11), and maximizing Wk with respect to tk yields
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tk(tij) =
4nk (2+3nk) 2(2 nk)tij
6 nk : (22)
In contrast to the best response function of the coalition, that of the country outside the coalition is still
downward sloping.
Solving this system, we obtain the following equilibrium tax rates under the coalition structure B(i;j),
tij
 B(i;j) =   (5 6)(ni+nj)10 ;
tk
 B(i;j) =   (5 6)nk+25 : (23)
To conclude this section, we now determine the welfare level of each country. Using (20) and (23), the
per capita consumption level of X in each country is x
 B(i;j) =    =5, while the market price is
p
 B(i;j) = =5. In equilibrium, aggregate demand (i.e. x  B(i;j)) is equal to aggregate production.
Substituting (23) into (19), we obtain Xi
 B(i;j) = Xj  B(i;j) = [5 (ni + nj) + 2 [1  3 (ni + nj)]] =10
and Xk
 B(i;j) = [5nk + 3 (1  2nk)] =5.
The gross surplus for country is i = A;B;C is CSi
 B(i;j) = [(1=50) (5  9) (5  ) + L]ni. Fi-
nally, the value of exports for country i is EXi
 B(i;j) = (=50) [5 (nj   ni)  2 (2ni + 3nj   1)], while
that of country j, i.e. EXj
 B(i;j) ; is given by permuting ni and nj into EXi  B(i;j). It follows that
EXk
 B(i;j) =    EXi  B(i;j)+ EXi  B(i;j) =    2=25 [5 (ni + nj)  2]. Substituting these expres-
sions into the welfare functions given by (12), one can obtain
Wi
 B(i;j) = 150 252ni   5 (11ni   nj) + 2(5ni   6nj + 2)+ niL  F; i 6= j;
Wk
 B(i;j) = 150 252nk   50nk + 2 (6  nk)+ nkL  F; (24)
and Wj
 B(i;j) is obtained by permuting ni and nj into Wi  B(i;j). Calculating the di¤erence between
aggregate welfare for the two countries i and j when they form a subcoalition and when they do not, i.e. 
Wi
 B(i;j)+Wj  B(i;j)  (Wi (BS) +Wj (BS)) where Wi (BS) and Wj (BS) are given by (15), we obtain
 
Wi
 B(i;j)+Wj  B(i;j)  (Wi (BS) +Wj (BS)) =  2452 [3  7 (ni + nj)] : (25)
Therefore, a two-country coalition increases the joint-welfare of the two participating members with respect
to the singleton coalition if and only if ni + nj  3=7. In other words, two countries would collectively
benet from being part of a coalition only if total population size is lower than that of the country outside
the coalition. The interpretation of this result is postponed to Section 6.3.1.
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6 Coalition Formation
6.1 Preliminaries
We now characterize the outcome of rst stage of the game at which each country decides on its membership
in a coalition in cognizance of the subsequent stages. A strategy for country i is a choice of a coalition
Si to which i wants to belong. Formally, the set of strategies for country i is given by: 8i 2 N;i =
fSi jSi 2 N and i 2 Si g. A strategy prole is denoted s = (SA; SB ; SC) 2 , where  stand for the set of
all strategy proles (i.e.   A  B  C).
A coalition-structure rule is given by a function, 	 :  ! B, that assigns to any s 2  a coali-
tion structure B = 	(s). We restrict attention to the coalition-structure rule which prescribes that a
coalition forms if and only if there is unanimity with respect to a partnership plan. For example, if
s = (fA;B;Cg ; fA;B;Cg ; fCg), then no coalition is formed because countries A and B chooses country
C as a partner, but country C is not available as a partner. If however s = (fA;Bg ; fA;Bg ; fA;B;Cg),
then countries A and B forms a coalition - since they agree on the partnership plan - but country C
remains a singleton. We identify a coalition structure B as an equilibrium coalition structure if B = 	(s)
for an equilibrium strategy prole s of the coalition-formation game.
The equilibrium concept used in this paper is that of coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (CPNE) due to
Bernheim, Peleg and Whinston (1987). Roughly, a strategy prole is coalition-proof if it is immune to
self-enforcing deviations by any coalition, and a deviation is self-enforcing if there is no further protable
deviation available to a subcoalition of players. In other words, a strategy prole is coalition proof if there
does not exist a credible deviation for a subset of countries.
In the following, for expositional felicity, we distinguish between two cases. We rst consider the case
where the coalition structure B(i;j) does not increase the joint-welfare of the two coalition partners, i.e.
ni + nj > 3=7 8i; j = A;B;C and i 6= j (see eq. (25)). Subsequently, we will consider the situation
where there exists a couple of countries i and j such that the coalition structure B(i;j) does increase the
joint-welfare of the two coalition partners (ni + nj  3=7).
6.2 The Grand Coalition BG Versus the Singleton Coalition BS
When ni + nj > 3=7, country i or j or both are worse o¤ under the coalition structure B(i;j) than under
the singleton coalition BS and, hence, B(i;j) cannot be supported by a CPNE as we will see in Proposition
1. Hence, in this section, we only determine the preference ordering of the three countries over the two
alternatives BG and BS . Calculating the di¤erence between Wi (BG) given by (18) and Wi (BS) given by
(15) for each country i = A;B;C, we obtain
Wi (BG) Wi (BS) = 81 [27 (1  3ni)  2(15  61ni)] ; i = A;B;C: (26)
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To simplify the exposition, let ^ (ni) such thatWi (BG) = Wi (BS) for i = A;B;C, i.e. ^ (ni) = (27=2)(1 
3ni)=(15  61ni).
We then have the following lemma which in fact holds independently of the country-size distribution.12
Lemma 1: The preference ordering for country i = A;B;C over BG and BS is: (i) Wi (BS) Wi (BG) if
ni  3=41 and   ^ (ni) or ni  1=3 and   ^ (ni); (ii) Wi (BG) Wi (BS) for all other congurations
of the parameters.
Corollary 1: If ni 2 [3=41; 1=3], then country i (for i = A;B;C) prefers BG to BS independently of .
To interpret these results, recall that each countrys welfare can be written as the sum of gross surplus plus
the value of exports minus production costs as shown by (12). Under the singleton coalition, the marginal
gross consumer surplus is p (BS)   , which is negative since p (BS) = =9, and becomes nil under the
grand coalition since p (BG) = . Then, the increase in the market price due to the formation of the grand
coalition leads to a decrease in produced and consumed quantities by 8=9. (Recall that the demand
function is x =   p). This in turn increases the gross consumer surplus of each country in proportion to
its population size.13
Now consider the impact of the formation of the grand coalition on the external trade of each country
and consider rst that ni  1=3. We have seen that, under the singleton coalition BS , a small country sets
higher tax rates than larger countries provided that the parameter reecting the environmental damage
is not too high (i.e.  < (9=10)). In this case, since the grand coalition sets a common tax rate, the
domestic rm of a relatively small country becomes more competitive and then benets from increased
export revenues.14 Hence, the grand coalition increases both the gross surplus and the value of external
trade of a net exporting country (whose relative size is lower than 1=3) with respect to the singleton
coalition.
Suppose now the spillover parameter is very high (i.e.   (9=10)). In this case, a relatively small
country (i.e. ni  1=3) undercuts larger countries under the singleton coalition and then becomes less
competitive under the grand coalition with a common tax rate, thus losing market shares and export
revenues. Therefore, for this country to prefer the grand coalition, it must be the case that the gross
surplus gain due to the formation of the grand coalition is large enough to compensate losses in export
revenues, implying that its population size must be su¢ ciently important. To be more specic, observe
12All the proofs are in the Appendix.
13 Indeed, the di¤erence in the gross surplus between BG and BS for country i is given by CSi (BG)   CSi (BS) = 
322=81

ni:
14We indeed have EXi (BG) EXi (BS) = (=27) (9  10) (1  3ni), which is positive when  < (9=10) and ni  1=3.
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that one must have    and that ^ (ni) is increasing in ni with ^ (ni = 3=41) = . A su¢ cient condition
for country i to prefers BG to BS is then that ni  3=41 (since then     ^ (ni)). In sum, country i
prefers to join the grand coalition than to remain a singleton whenever ni 2 [3=41; 1=3] independently of
the size of the spillover parameter as stated in corollary 1.
When ni =2 [3=41; 1=3], country i may also prefer to join the grand coalition than to remain a singleton
depending on the extent of the pollution externality, as stated in Lemma 1. Indeed, for country i to prefer
to remain a singleton when ni  3=41 (respectively, ni  1=3), it must be the case that the pollution
externality is larger (respectively, lower) than ^ (ni). Consider rst that ni  3=41 and   ^ (ni), which
implies that  > (9=10). In this case, the signicant decrease in consumed quantities resulting from the
formation of the grand coalition - because of a high  - has a strong negative impact on the external trade
(i.e. on exports) of the small country, all the more this country cannot longer undercut larger countries.15
This negative impact on the external trade dominates the positive impact on the gross consumer surplus,
and so in this case country i prefers BS to BG.
Consider now that ni  1=3 and   ^ (ni), which implies  < (9=10). In this case, under BG,
the large country i cannot longer undercut smaller countries, and consumed quantities do not decrease
su¢ ciently to avoid an increase in import costs. And this increased cost cannot be compensated by the
gain in gross surplus when the grand coalition is formed compared to the singleton coalition.
We can now state the following Proposition.
Proposition 1: Suppose that ni + nj > 3=7 8i; j = A;B;C and i 6= j. The unique equilibrium coalition
structure is: (i) BS if there is at least one country i for which ni  3=41 and   ^ (ni) or ni  1=3 and
  ^ (ni); (ii) BG in all other cases.
The interpretation of this Proposition and that of Proposition 2 in the next sub-section is postponed to
Section 6.4
6.3 The Possibility of Subcoalitions B(i;j)
Suppose now that there exists a couple of countries i and j such that the coalition structure B(i;j) increases
the joint-welfare of the two coalition members with respect to the singleton coalition, i.e. ni+nj  3=7. It
should be noted that this does not necessarily implies that both countries will agree with this partnership
plan.
6.3.1 The Coalition B(i;j) versus the Singleton Coalition BS
We rst compare for each country its preference ordering over the coalition structures B(i;j) and BS . Using
15Recall that under BS a small country undercuts its competitors when  > (9=10).
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(15) and (24), the welfare di¤erence for country i between B(i;j) and BS is given by
Wi
 B(i;j) Wi (BS) = 4050 [2 (6 + 215ni   243nj)  405(ni   nj)] ; i 6= j: (27)
The respective welfare di¤erence for country j, i.e. Wj
 B(i;j) Wj (BS) is given by permuting ni and nj
into (27).
This welfare di¤erence can be positive or negative depending on the country size asymmetry as well as
on the value of the marginal environmental damage. For example, if  is relatively small and if (ni   nj)
is positive and relatively large, then the formation of the subcoalition would be detrimental to the larger
country.
To simplify our analysis, we now assume throughout the rest of the paper that ni = nj = n implying
that nk = 1  2n. In this case, the welfare di¤erence for countries i and j when they form a coalition and
when they do not is given by
Wi
 B(i;j) Wi (BS) = Wj  B(i;j) Wj (BS) = 2 452 [3  14n]: (28)
The welfare di¤erence for the country outside the coalition is given by
Wk
 B(i;j) Wk (BS) = 28 452 [5 + 2n]: (29)
We can now state - directly from (28) and (29) - the following lemma.
Lemma 2: Suppose ni = nj = n  3=14 which implies nk = 1   2n > 4=7. Hence, all countries prefer
the coalition structure B(i;j) to the singleton coalition Bs, independently of the extent of the pollution
externality.
When the coalition structure B(i;j) forms, it increases the market price from p (BS) = =9 to p
 B(i;j) =
=5, reducing total consumed quantities by 4=45. Again, this leads to an increase in the gross consumer
surplus of each country in proportion to its population size, that is CSi
 B(i;j) CSi (BS) = 152 (=45)2 n
for country i (or j), while n is replaced by (1  2n) for country k.
Now, let evaluate the impact of the formation of the coalition structure B(i;j) on each countrys ex-
ternal trade. As shown before, the value of external trade for country i (or j) under BS is EXi (BS) = 
2=27

(1  3n), while it amounts to EXi
 B(i;j) =  2=25 (1  5n) under B(i;j). Calculating the di¤er-
ence, we have EXi
 B(i;j) EXi (BS) =    22=675 (30n  1) implying that EXk  B(i;j) EXk (BS) = 
42=675

(30n  1).
It appears that the formation of the subcoalition has most often a negative impact on the value of the
external trade of the two coalition members. This is indeed the case if population size in country i (or
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j) is not too small, i.e. n  1=30. The reason is that the two coalition members set a higher tax rate,
and then their domestic rms are less competitive, under the coalition structure B(i;j) than under the
singleton coalition BS , while the reverse holds for the outsider. Hence, when n  1=30, the formation of
the subcoalition induces for each coalition member a decrease in export revenues and an increase in gross
surplus but the latter e¤ect is stronger provided the population size of each coalition member is small
enough (i.e. n  3=14).
This is somewhat surprising because the gain in gross surplus due to the formation of the subcoalition
is increasing in country size. The explanation is the following. The larger the population size of each
coalition member, the greater is the impact of the pollution externality on the joint consumer surplus and
the higher is the incentive to tax polluting production so as to internalize pollution externalities. Country
k best responds to an increasing tax rate in the coalition by decreasing its own tax rate to take advantage
of the increased cost incurred by the rms of the coalition. In fact, the strategic response of country k is
inversely related to its size, as one can infer from (22). It follows that the larger the population sizes of
country i and j and the lower the size of country k, the greater is the incentive for country k to reduce
its tax rate, and this negative e¤ect on the competitiveness of countries i and j overcomes their gains in
gross surplus for n > 3=14.16
Now, suppose that the population sizes of country i and j are very small, i.e. n < 1=30 < 3=14.
In this case, the two coalition partners record an increase in export revenues following the formation of
the subcoalition. Intuitively, when country-size is very small, export quantities are su¢ ciently large for
the decrease in export quantities to be compensated by the increase in the export price. Since, coalition
members also register an increase in gross surplus, they unambiguously prefer to form a subcoalition than
to remain singletons.
Now consider the impact of the formation of the coalition on the value of external trade of the country
that remains outside the coalition, i.e. country k. If n < 1=30, then country k experiences an increase in
import costs but it also experiences a huge gain in gross surplus since country size is very large (1  2n >
14=15). If n  1=30, then the formation of the coalition between countries i and j leads to both a decrease
in import costs and to an increase in gross surplus for country k. As a result, country k always benet
from the formation of the coalition structure B(i;j).
6.3.2 Equilibrium Coalition Structures
We need to determine each countrys preference ordering over the three coalition structures. First, Lemma
16We indeed have

CSi
 B(i;j)  CSi (BS) + EXi  B(i;j)  EXi (BS) = 2 452 (3  14n), which is negative for n >
3=14.
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1 determines each countrys preference ordering over BG and BS independently of the country-size distrib-
ution, and so this lemma remains valid when ni = nj = n  3=14 and nk = 1  2n > 4=7. Second, Lemma
2 states that when ni = nj = n  3=14 all countries prefer the coalition structure B(i;j) to the singleton
coalition BS . Therefore, we just need to calculate the welfare di¤erence between B(i;j) and BG for each
country.
When countries i and j form a subcoalition and ni = nj = n, the welfare level of each country is given
(from (24)) by
Wi
 B(i;j) = Wj  B(i;j) = 150 25(  2)n+ 2(2  n)+ nL  F;
Wk
 B(i;j) = 150 25 (  2) (1  2n) + 2 (5 + 2n)+ (1  2n)L  F: (30)
Using (18) and (30), the welfare di¤erence between BG and B(i;j) for country i (or j) is thus given by
Wi (BG) Wi
 B(i;j) = Wj (BG) Wj  B(i;j) = 75 [25 (1  3n)  2(14  57n)] ; (31)
while the di¤erence in welfare between BG and B(i;j) for country k is given by
Wk (BG) Wk
 B(i;j) = 275 [ 25(1  3n) + 2(20  57n)] : (32)
To simplify the exposition of the results, let ^ij(n) such that Wi (BG) = Wi
 B(i;j), i.e. ^ij(n) =
(25=2)(1 3n)=(14 57n); and ^k(n) such thatWk (BG) = Wk
 B(i;j) i.e. ^k(n) = (25=2) (1  3n) = (20  57n).
Observe that ^ (n) > ^ij(n) > ^k(n) > ^ (1  2n) 8n 2 [0; 3=14], where ^ (n) (or ^ (1  2n)) is given just
above Lemma 1.
We rst determine the preference ordering for countries i and j. We have
Lemma 3: Suppose ni = nj = n  3=14. Then, the preference ordering for country i - or country
j - is: (i) Wi
 B(i;j)  Wi (BG)  Wi (BS) if n  1=13 and ^ij(n)    ^ (n); (ii) Wi  B(i;j) 
Wi (BS)  Wi (BG) if   ^ (n) (implying n  3=41); (iii) Wi (BG)  Wi
 B(i;j)  Wi (BS) if n  1=13
and   ^ij(n) or if n  1=13.
The following lemma describes the preference ordering for country k.
Lemma 4: Suppose ni = nj = n  3=14 implying nk = 1   2n > 4=7. Then, the preference ordering
for country k is: (i) Wk
 B(i;j)  Wk (BG)  Wk (BS) if ^k(n)    ^ (1  2n); (ii) Wk  B(i;j) 
Wk (BS) Wk (BG) if   ^ (1  2n); (iii) Wk (BG) Wk
 B(i;j) Wk (BS) if   ^k(n).
Again, we need to focus only on the preference ordering over B(i;j) and BG for each country. We mention
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rst that the market price under the coalition structure B(i;j), i.e. p
 B(i;j) = =5, is lower than that
under the grand coalition where it is equal to the marginal cost of pollution, i.e. p (BG) = . This implies
that total quantities produced and consumed are lower by 4=5 under the grand coalition compared to
the coalition structure B(i;j), which leads to an increase in the gross surplus of each country in proportion
to its population size.17
Now, let evaluate the di¤erence in the value of external trade between the two coalition structures
B(i;j) and BG for each country, starting with country k. Again, when countries i and j form a coalition,
country k undercuts the tax rate of the coalition, i.e. tk
 B(i;j) < tij  B(i;j) for any nk > 4=7, as one
can infer from (23). Now, if country k joins the grand coalition and sets the same tax rate than its
partners, it becomes less competitive and then may su¤er from increased import costs. We indeed have
EXk (BG)   EXk
 B(i;j) =   (2=75) [25 (1  3n)  2 (14  45n)], which is negative for any   (n)
with (n) = (25=2)(1   3n)=(14   45n). If the pollution externality is even lower than (n), i.e.  
^k(n) <
(n), then the increase in gross surplus following the accession to the grand coalition is not
su¢ cient to compensate the increased import costs and, hence, country k prefers to be an outsider under
the coalition structure B(i;j) than to join the grand coalition (as stated in (i) and (ii) of Lemma 4). As 
increases it becomes more protable for country k to join the grand coalition. Indeed, the greater  the
lower are consumed quantities under BG compared to B(i;j), which alleviates the increased import costs
and further contributes to the increase in gross surplus. Hence, when the spillover parameter is su¢ ciently
large (i.e.   ^k(n)), preferences of country k are reversed and it prefers to join the grand coalition than
to be an outsider (as stated in (iii) of Lemma 4). If  further increases and becomes larger than (n),
country k experiences both a large increase in gross surplus and a decrease in import costs by acceding to
the grand coalition.
We now consider the preference ordering between B(i;j) and BG for country i or j. The di¤erence
in the value of external trade between B(i;j) and BG for country i, or j, is EXi (BG)   EXi
 B(i;j) =
(=75) [25 (1  3n)  2 (14  45n)], which is negative for any   (n). The argument is symmetric
to that for country k. When the pollution externality is relatively large, the decrease in produced and
consumed quantities due to the formation of the grand coalition is su¢ ciently large for countries i and j
to register a decrease in export revenues even though country k can no longer undercut the tax rate of
countries i and j. If the pollution externality is even larger than (n), i.e.   ^ij(n) > (n), the decrease
in export revenues cannot be compensated by the increase in gross surplus, and then countries i and j
prefer the coalition structure B(i;j) to the grand coalition, as stated in (i) and (ii) of Lemma 3.
17We indeed have CSi (BG)   CSi
 B(i;j) =  82=25n for country i (or j) while for country k, n must be replaced by
(1  2n).
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In fact, one can observe that ^ij(n) is increasing in n and that it is equal to  in n = 1=13. Since
  ,   ^ij(n) can hold only if n  1=13 - as stated in (i) of Lemma 3 - so that the formation of the
grand coalition has a limited impact on the gross consumer surplus of country i (or j), due to its small
size. If   ^ (n), then   ^ij(n) and countries i and j still prefer B(i;j) to BG, but this implies that the
population size of each coalition partner is even lower. This is because ^ (n) is increasing in n and reaches
 in n = 3=41, and so   ^ (n) can hold only if n  3=41 < 1=13, as stated in (ii) of Lemma 3. For such
a small country, the positive e¤ect on consumer surplus due to the formation of BG is even more limited.
Now, when the pollution externality decreases below   ^ij(n), then the negative impact on export
revenues due to the formation of the grand coalition is small enough to be compensated by the increase in
gross surplus. In fact, if  is even lower than ^ij(n), i.e.   (n) < ^ij(n), the formation of the grand
coalition leads to an increase in export revenues for countries i and j. Therefore, for   ^ij(n), countries
i and j prefer BG to B(i;j), as stated in (iii) of Lemma 3. This is also the case if population size in country
i (or j) is large enough, i.e. n  1=13.18 This is because a large population size implies a large increase in
gross surplus when the grand coalition is formed.
We can now state the following Proposition.
Proposition 2: Suppose ni = nj = n  3=14 implying nk = 1   2n > 4=7. The unique equilibrium
coalition structure is: (i) B(i;j) if   ^k(n) or if   ^ij(n); (ii) BG if ^k(n)    ^ij(n).
We now turn to the interpretation of Propositions 1 and 2 on the equilibrium outcome of the coalition
formation game.
6.4 Interpretation of the results
To interpret Propositions 1 and 2 together, we consider increasing values of the parameter  reecting the
pollution externality. Suppose rst that the environmental damage due to production of X is verylow.
In this case, the larger country (i.e. country k) undercuts countries i and j under the singleton coalition
BS . Therefore, the formation of a grand coalition BG with a common tax rate, results in a loss (gain) of
competitiveness for country k (country i or j). Moreover, since the spillover parameter is relatively low,
the environmental policy under BG slightly decreases produced and consumed quantities compared to BS .
In turn, for the larger country k, the signicant increase in import costs cannot compensate the moderate
gain in gross consumer surplus. Countries i and j would like to form the grand coalition than to remain
singletons because BG increases both their gross surplus and their export revenues, but country k is not
available as a partner when  is low.
18Again, when n  1=13, we have ^ij(n) >  and so   ^ij(n) since   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As the spillover parameter increases, the grand coalition sets a more stringent environmental tax policy,
and so produced and consumed quantities decrease more signicantly. For the larger country, the formation
of the grand coalition is then less costly in terms of imports costs, while the gain in gross surplus becomes
more important. There is thus a threshold value of , i.e. ^ (1  2n), above which the larger country
becomes available as a partner in the grand coalition, provided countries i and j have no interest in
forming a subcoalition (i.e. n > 3=14).
If, however, the coalition structure B(i;j) is welfare-improving for countries i and j, then country k
may prefer to remain a singleton even though   ^ (1  2n). The reason is that the coalition structure
B(i;j) gives rise to a strategic advantage for country k. Indeed, recall than under the coalition structure
B(i;j), the two coalition members set a higher tax rate than under BS so as to internalize the pollution
externality and the market externality between the domestic rms. In turn, the larger country undercuts
the coalition to take advantage of the increased costs incurred by the rms of the coalition and to make
its own rm more competitive on international markets. As a result, for the larger country to resign its
competitive advantage and to join the grand coalition, it requires greater benets from internalizing the
pollution externality and hence a higher , i.e.   ^k(n) > ^ (1  2n). Indeed, when   ^k(n), the
decrease in produced and consumed quantities induced by BG as compared to B(i;j) - implying an increase
in gross surplus and a slight increase in import costs - is large enough for the larger country to most prefer
the grand coalition. As the spillover parameter further increases and becomes larger than (n) (with
(n) > ^k(n)), the larger country records both an increase in gross surplus and a decrease in import costs,
although it resigned its competitive advantage.
Now let consider again that countries i and j do not have interest in forming a subcoalition. In this case,
as just mentioned above, country k agrees to form the grand coalition for any   ^ (1  2n). Countries i
and j also agree to join the grand coalition except if the spillover parameter is verylarge. Indeed, recall
that in that case, smaller countries undercut the larger country under the singleton coalition BS . It follows
that the formation of the grand coalition implies, for those countries, a decrease in competitiveness and
export revenues, especially since produced and consumed quantities sharply decrease as a result of a large
value of . As the spillover parameter decreases, this negative impact on the external trade of countries
i and j becomes less important compared to the gain gross surplus. There is thus a threshold value of ,
i.e. ^ (n), below which countries i and j agree to form the grand coalition. Again, a su¢ cient condition
for   ^ (n) to be satised is that n  3=41, which is rather intuitive because the benet in gross surplus
due to the formation of the grand coalition is increasing in group size.
Now, let consider that countries i and j prefer the coalition structure B(i;j) to the singleton coalition
BS (i.e. n  3=14). In this case - for countries i and j to join country k in the grand coalition - the
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environmental pollution externality must be even lower than ^ (n), i.e.   ^ij (n) < ^ (n). In other
words, when  > ^ij (n), countries i and j are better o¤ by letting country k stay outside the coalition and
free-ride on them. The explanation is the following. First, recall that  > ^ij(n) necessarily implies that
n < 1=13. So, if the population size of the subcoalition is relatively small, BG has a limited positive impact
on the gross consumer surplus of each coalition member and, if the environmental damage is relatively
high, BG has a strong impact on their external trade. Indeed, the greater  the lower are produced and
consumed quantities under BG compared to B(i;j).
Obviously, under BG, the common pollution tax rate implies that all rms have equal market shares,
whereas letting country k be an outsider (under B(i;j)) implies a competitive framework. Indeed, we have
seen that the formation of the subcoalition gives rise to a strategic response of the outsider that decreases
its own tax rate to increase domestic production. However, for the outsider, increasing production also
reduces the gross surplus especially when both  and population size are large. Hence, for high values
of  and nk, country k is not willing to substantially reduce its tax rate so that it captures a moderate
competitive advantage over the two coalition members. As a result, in this case, countries i and j sign up
together without country k. The resulting coalition structure B(i;j), when  > ^ij (n), avoids the strong
decrease in export markets that would arise with the grand coalition BG, while the losses in market shares
(for countries i and j) remain moderate since the tax policy of country k is slightly aggressive due to its
large size.
In conclusion, when the coalition structure B(i;j) is a protable alternative for countries i and j to the
singleton coalition BS , the parameter reecting the pollution externality must lie within a restricted range
(i.e.
h
^k(n); ^ij(n)
i
) for the grand coalition BG to be the (unique) equilibrium coalition structure.
7 Conclusion
The main conclusion of this paper is that a multi-step process is less likely to give rise to a global inter-
national environmental agreement than a one-step process. Indeed, once a rst group of countries sign
an IEA, it modies the incentives of all countries to sign a global agreement and, actually, it makes them
more demanding than if a preliminary restricted agreement was not signed. In addition, the further en-
largement of the initial coalition may be blocked, not only by the outsider(s), but also by the insiders
depending on the size of the pollution externality and on the country-size asymmetry. Overall, the grand
coalition is less likely to emerge when subcoalitions are protable which implies  in the context of our
model a strong country-size asymmetry. To deal with this asymmetry problem, this suggests that the
European Union should speak with one voice with the other big producers-polluters (such as US, China or
India) to push forward a (real) global environmental agreement. Admittedly, one reason for the failure of
24
the Copenhagen climate change summit in December 2009 was that Europe spoke with many and, often,
controversial voices.
The simplicity of the framework analyzed in this paper is attractive but might be criticized on sev-
eral fronts. For example, we assumed that the marginal environmental damage caused by production is
the same in each country. This assumption seems reasonable to analyze strategic interactions amongst
advanced industrial countries. But it is less convincing to analyze strategic interactions between, for ex-
ample, countries of the EU and emerging and developing countries. More importantly, we assumed that
countries decide on whether to join a coalition once for all and furthermore that side payments are not
allowed. Repeated interactions and the possibility to make (or receive) transfers would certainly modify
the incentives to sign an IEA, but not necessarily in the expected direction.19 Clearly, the paper leaves
questions that need to be addressed in future research.
8 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Lemma 1
We have Wi (BS) Wi (BG) whenever i (ni; ; )  27(1 3ni) 2(15 61ni)  0. Suppose rst that
(15  61ni)  0 or ni  15=61 < 1=3. Then i (ni; ; )  0 for any   ^(ni)  (27=2)(1  3ni)=(15 
61ni). ^(ni) is increasing in ni and is equal to  in ni = 3=41. Yet, one must have   . Therefore,
when ni  15=61,   ^(ni) can be satised only if ni  3=41 < 15=61. Suppose now that (15  61ni)  0
or ni  15=61. In this case, i (ni; ; )  0 for any   ^(ni). ^(ni) is negative for any ni 2 [15=61; 1=3]
and becomes positive from ni = 1=3. Since   0,   ^(ni) for ni  15=61 can be satised only if
ni  1=3 > 15=61. Corollary 1 directly follows from this.
8.2 Proof of Lemma 3
(i) Wi
 B(i;j)  Wi (BG) whenever 25(1   3n)   2(14   57n)  0. One have n  3=14 < 14=57.
Hence 14  57n > 0 and Wi
 B(i;j)  Wi (BG) for any   ij(n)  (25=2)(1  3n)=(14  57n). ij(n)
is increasing in n and is equal to  in n = 1=13. Yet, one must have   . Therefore,   ij(n)
can be satised only if n  1=13 < 3=14. From Corollary 1, we also have Wi (BG)  Wi (BS) for any
n 2 [3=41; 1=13]. If now n < 3=41, then from Lemma 1, Wi (BG) Wi (BS) when   ^(n).
(ii) From Lemma 2, Wi
 B(i;j)  Wi (BS) independently of  when n  3=14. Now using Lemma 1,
we have that Wi (BS) Wi (BG) when   ^(n), which implies n  3=41.
(iii) From (i) just above, Wi (BG)  Wi
 B(i;j) if n  1=13 and   ij(n) or if n  1=13 since, in
19For example, Hoel and Schneider (1997) in a reduced-form model show that side payments may substantially reduce the
incentives to join an IEA.
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this latter case,   ij(n) is always satised. From Lemma 2, we also have Wi
 B(i;j)  Wi (BS) since
n  3=14.
8.3 Proof of Lemma 4
(i) Wk
 B(i;j) Wk (BG) whenever  25(1 3n)+2(20 57n)  0. One have n  3=14 < 20=57. Hence
20  57n > 0 and Wk
 B(i;j) Wk (BG) for any   k(n)  (25=2)(1  3n)=(20  57n). One must also
verify that k(n)  0, which is indeed the case for any n  3=14. This is because k(n) is decreasing in n
and is equal to (125=218) > 0 in n = 3=14, implying that k(n) is positive for any n  3=14. Now using
Lemma 1, when nk = 1  2n > 4=7 > 1=3, we have Wk (BG) Wk (BS) for   ^(1  2n).
(ii) From Lemma 2, Wk
 B(i;j)  Wk (BS) independently of  when n  3=14. From (i) just above,
Wk (BS) Wk (BG) if   ^(1  2n).
(iii) From (i) just above, Wk (BG)  Wk
 B(i;j) if   k(n) and, again, from Lemma 2 we also have
Wk
 B(i;j) Wk (BS) since n  3=14.
8.4 Proof of Proposition 1
From (25), when ni + nj > 3=7 8i; j = A;B;C and i 6= j, we must have at least one country - say country
i - for which Wi
 B(i;j) < Wi(BS). This implies that B(i;j) cannot be an equilibrium coalition structure.
Indeed, for B(i;j) to be an equilibrium coalition structure, the strategy prole s =
 
Si ; S

j ; S

k

with
Si = S

j = fi; jg must be a CPNE. But when Wi
 B(i;j) < Wi(BS), country i has a protable deviation
to Si = fig, giving rise to the singleton coalition BS . Therefore, there are only two coalition structures
that are equilibrium candidates in the rst stage of the game: BG and BS .
For the grand coalition to be an equilibrium structure, it must be the case that s^ =

S^i; S^j ; S^k

with
S^i = S^j = S^k = fi; j; kg is a CPNE. Therefore, if there is one country - say country i - for which ni  3=41
and   ^ (ni) or ni  1=3 and   ^ (ni), then this country prefers (from Lemma 1) to remain a
singleton than to join the grand coalition. This country would then deviate from the strategy prole s^
to Si = fig, thus giving rise to 	(Si; S^j ; S^k) = BS. Such a deviation is immune to further protable
joint deviation - here by countries j and k - because nj + nk > 3=7 which implies that country j (or k)
prefers to be a singleton than to form a two-country coalition. Finally, unilateral deviation by country
j or country k would have no e¤ect on the resultant coalition structure BS . Therefore, BS is the unique
equilibrium coalition structure. In all other parameter congurations - i.e. ni 2 [3=41; 1=3] ; or ni  3=41
and   ^ (ni) or ni  1=3 and   ^ (ni) - all countries prefer BG to BS and at least one country (i
or j) is worse o¤ under B(i;j) than under BS . Therefore, s^ being immune to any deviation - unilateral or
multilateral - it is the unique CPNE, resulting in the formation of the grand coalition BG.
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8.5 Proof of Proposition 2
Consider rst that   ^ (1  2n) < ^k(n). Then Lemma 4 implies for country k that Wk
 B(i;j) 
Wk (BS)  Wk (BG), while Lemma 3 implies for countries i and j that Wi (BG)  Wi
 B(i;j)  Wi (BS).
In this case any strategy prole s =
 
Si ; S

j ; S

k

with Si = S

j = fi; jg is a CPNE and gives rise the
coalition structure B(i;j) regardless of Sk . Countries i and j prefer the grand coalition BG to the coalition
structure B(i;j), but country k prefers to remain a singleton than to join the grand coalition. Hence,
s^ =

S^i; S^j ; S^k

with S^i = S^j = S^k = fi; j; kg - which is the unique strategy prole giving rise to BG -
is not a CPNE because country k has an incentive to deviate from s^ to Sk = fkg. Therefore, countries i
and j do not have any incentive to deviate from s because any deviation - unilateral or multilateral from
Si = S

j = fi; jg - would result in the singleton coalition which is dominated by B(i;j) for countries i and
j. Finally, a unilateral deviation by country k from s has no e¤ect on the resultant coalition structure.
Therefore, if   ^ (1  2n), the unique equilibrium coalition structure is B(i;j).
Consider now that ^ (1  2n) <   ^k(n). Then Lemma 4 implies for country k that Wk
 B(i;j) 
Wk (BG)  Wk (BS), while Lemma 3 implies for countries i and j that Wi (BG)  Wi
 B(i;j)  Wi (BS).
The coalition structure BS cannot be supported by a CPNE since countries i and j have a protable
joint deviation to Si = S

j = fi; jg giving rise to the coalition structure B(i;j), irrespective of country ks
choice. In fact, the coalition structure B(i;j) can result from four strategy proles: s = (fi; jg; fi; jg; fkg),
s = (fi; jg; fi; jg; fi; kg), s = (fi; jg; fi; jg; fj; kg) or s = (fi; jg; fi; jg; fi; j; kg). The rst three strat-
egy proles constitute a CPNE. However, the strategy prole s = (fi; jg; fi; jg; fi; j; kg) is not a CPNE
because countries i and j have a joint protable deviation to Si = Sj = fi; j; kg so as to perform
the grand coalition what gives them a higher welfare than B(i;j). But the resulting strategy prole
s^ = (fi; j; kg; fi; j; kg; fi; j; kg) is not a CPNE because country k would have a protable deviation to
any other strategy than Sk = fi; j; kg so as to induce the coalition structure B(i;j), which is most preferred
by country k. Indeed, a unilateral deviation from s^ by country k would lead to the singleton coalition BS ,
which in turn would lead to a further joint deviation by countries i and j to Si = S

j = fi; jg. This is
because Si = S

j = fi; jg leads to the coalition structure B(i;j) that is preferred by both countries i and j
to the singleton coalition BS . To summarize, for any   ^k(n), the unique equilibrium coalition structure
is B(i;j).
This is also the case when   ^ij(n). Indeed, in this case, BG is the most preferred coalition structure
by country k (Lemma 4). However, from Lemma 3, countries i and j prefer the coalition structure B(i;j)
to BG so that they will not accept country k as a coalition partner. Since countries i and j also prefer
B(i;j) to the singleton coalition, the unique coalition structure supported by a CPNE is again B(i;j).
To summarize, B(i;j) is the unique equilibrium coalition structure for any  =2
h
^k(n); ^ij(n)
i
, as stated
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in (i) of Proposition 2.
(ii) If ^k(n)    ^ij(n), then by Lemma 3 and 4, we have that the grand coalition structure BG
is preferred to both B(i;j) and BS by all three countries. In other words, there is unanimity to form the
grand coalition BG and hence s^ =

S^i; S^j ; S^k

is the unique CPNE which then leads to BG, as stated in
(ii) of Proposition 2.
References
[1] Alesina, A., and V. Grilli, (1993), "On the Feasibility of a One or Multi-Speed European Monetary
Union," NBER Working Paper N4350.
[2] Barnett, A.H., (1980), The Pigouvian Tax Rule under Monopoly,American Economic Review 70(5),
1037-1041.
[3] Barrett, S., (1994a), Strategic Environmental Policy and International Trade, Journal of Public
Economics 54, 325-338.
[4] Barrett, S., (1994b), "Self-enforcing International Environmental Agreements," Oxford Economic Pa-
pers 46, 878894.
[5] Barrett, S., (2001), "International Cooperation for Sale," European Economic Review 45, 1835-1850.
[6] Bernheim, B.D., Peleg B., and M.D. Whinston, (1987), "Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria," Journal
of Economic Theory 42(1), 1-12.
[7] Bloch, F., (1996), "Sequential Formation of Coalitions in Games with Externalities and Fixed Payo¤
Division," Games and Economic Behavior 14, 90-123.
[8] Brander, J.A., and B.J. Spencer, (1985), "Export Subsidies and International Market Share Rivalry,"
Journal of International Economics 18, 83-100.
[9] Carraro C. and C. Marchiori, (2003), "Stable Coalitions," in C. Carraro (ed), The Endogenous For-
mation of Economic Coalitions, E. Elgar, Cheltenham.
[10] Carraro C. and D. Siniscalco, (1993), "Strategies for the International Protection of the Environment,
Journal of Public Economics 52, 309328.
[11] Cheikbossian, G., (2010), "La Coordination des Politiques Environnementales entre Deux Pays de
Taille Asymétrique," Revue Économique 61, 11-30.
28
[12] DAspremont, C., Jacquemin, J., Gabszewicz, J., and Weymark, J. (1983), "On the stability of
collusive price leadership," Canadian Journal of Economics 16, 17-25.
[13] Conrad, K., (1993), Taxes and Subsidies for Pollution-Intensive Industries as Trade Policy,Journal
of Environmental Economics and Management 25, 121-135.
[14] Duval, Y., and S. Hamilton, (2002), Strategic Environmental Policy and International Trade in
Asymmetric Oligopoly Markets,International Tax and Public Finance 9, 259-271.
[15] Finus, M., and B. Rundshagen, (1998), "Toward a Positive Theory of Coalition Formation and In-
strumental Choice in Global Pollution Control," Public Choice 96, 145-186.
[16] Finus, M., and B. Rundshagen, (2009), "Membership Rules and Stability of Coalition Structures in
Positive Externality Games," Social Choice and Welfare 32, 389-406.
[17] Hoel, M., (1992), International Environmental Conventions: The Case of Uniform Reductions of
Emissions,Environmental and Resource Economics 2, 141-59.
[18] Hoel, M., and K. Schneider, (1997), "Incentives to Participate in an International Environmental
Agreement," Environmental and Resource Economics 9, 153-170.
[19] Horstmann, I.J. and J.R. Markusen, (1992), Endogenous market structures in international trade
(natura facit saltum)Journal of International Economics 32, 109-129.
[20] Kennedy, P., (1994), Equilibrium Pollution Taxes in Open Economies with Imperfect Competition,
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 27, 49-63.
[21] Krutilla, K., (1991), Environmental Regulation in an Open Economy, Journal of Environmental
Economics and Management 20, 127-142.
[22] Ray, D., and R., Vohra, (1999), "A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures,"Games and Economic
Behavior 26, 286-336.
[23] Tanguay, G.A., (2001), Strategic Environmental Policies under International Duopolistic Competi-
tion,International Tax and Public Finance 8, 793-811.
[24] Yi, S-S., (1996), "Endogenous Formation of Customs Unions under Imperfect Competition: Open
Regionalism is Good," Journal of International Economics 41, 153-177.
29
